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Abstract This paper investigates the structure, function and wealth distribution within
the Pangasius hypophthalmus and Henicorhynchus spp./Labiobarbus spp. value chains in
the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. The analysis is driven by key questions relating to the form
and function of value chains, their contribution to the livelihoods of farmers and fishers, the
effectiveness of government policy and the potential for value chain governance mecha-
nisms, such as contracts and certification, to steer towards sustainable production. The
results indicate that actors in the high value Pangasius hypopthalmus export chain have a
higher potential income, but face considerably higher economic vulnerability from global
markets. Alternatively, Henichorhychus/Labiobarbus spp. fishers are severely constrained
in their ability to negotiate higher prices for their fish but appear to be less vulnerable to
economic and environmental change. The paper concludes that for value chain governance
to improve the livelihoods of fishers and farmers in both high and low value chains, new
arrangements are needed that better accommodate customary institutions and informal
market relations.
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1 Introduction
The sustainable development of the fisheries sector in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam
(Fig. 1) is dependent on a shared understanding of how fishery resources are exploited
through both domestic and international value chains (Loc et al. 2007). Faced with the poor
enforcement of ‘internal’ state legislation, the Vietnamese government has turned to
‘external’ value chain governance mechanisms (see Kaplinsky 2000; Humphrey and
Schmitz 2004), including production contracts and certification, to improve efficiency and
promote higher environmental performance and social equity. Given the dependency of
rural populations on Mekong fisheries, both capture and culture (Sinh 2007), it is widely
believed improved value chain governance will contribute to the more efficient transfer of
Fig. 1 Study provinces in the Mekong Basin
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fish to market, providing higher margins for fishers and farmers, and improved leverage for
steering the industry towards sustainable production.
This paper addresses these assumptions by providing new insights into the domestic
structure, function and wealth distribution within value chains for Pangasius hypoph-
thalmus and Henicorhynchus spp./Labiobarbus spp. in the Mekong Delta. Pangasius
hypophthalmus represents a high global chain, with approximately 650,000 tonnes of fillets
traded to international markets at a value of US$1.45 billion (Dung 2008). In contrast,
Henicorhynchus spp. and Labiobarbus spp. (Ca Linh in Vietnamese) provides a staple
supply of essential protein to fishers in all of the riparian countries, as well as being traded
extensively in local and regional markets fresh, dried and fermented (Bush and Le Minh
2006).
The research combines value chain and livelihoods analysis (Kaplinsky and Morris
2000; Ellis 2000; Mitchell and Shepherd 2006) to address three main questions: (1) What
are the key functions of chain actors in different market channels, where are they located
and what proportion of total market value they receive? (2) What contribution does each
value chain make to the livelihoods of fishers and farmers? (3) What are the challenges for
implementing improved value chain governance? By unravelling the structure and function
of these domestic chains, we focus our attention on the capacity of Henicorhynchus spp./
Labiobarbus spp. fishers and P. hypophthalmus farmers to maintain their livelihoods
dependent on access to these value chains, and the potential of state and non-state gov-
ernance arrangements to steer the industry towards more equitable and environmentally
responsible production practices.
The paper begins with a description of the methodology used in the value chain and
livelihoods analysis, followed by the presentation of results. The remainder of the paper
discusses the form and function of the two value chains, the role of income generation and
bargaining power, and finally, the potential of value chain governance mechanisms to steer
more environmental friendly and more equitable production of both aquaculture and
fisheries in the Mekong Delta.
2 Methodology
The data for this study were generated through a combined value chain and livelihoods
analysis. The value chain analysis, based on the approach of Kaplinsky and Morris (2000)
and Porter (1998, 2000), maps the material and financial flows from input suppliers to
market. The methodology enabled us to calculate the main expenses and net profit margins
of production for the actors and consolidate the expenses and margins from the rest of the
chain. The analysis emphasises the value added to the fish at each transaction in the chain,
calculated as the selling price minuses buying price, not taking into account fixed or
variable costs of each actor. The data were then mapped using the ValueLinks approach
developed by GTZ (2007), illustrating the main export and domestic channels, proportional
outputs and a description of key functions.
The livelihoods survey focused on the contribution of the P. hypophthalmus and
Henicorhynchus spp./Labiobarbus spp. value chains to household income and the degree to
which both farmers and fishers are able to make decisions over productive activities and
investment strategies (Ellis 2000; Mitchell and Shepherd 2006). As such, the analysis
moved beyond ‘household’-related factors to include a broader range of economic and
political ‘mediating processes’ that govern production practices and access to markets
(Allison and Ellis 2001). The livelihood analysis, therefore, provides a description of
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decision-making and investment strategies in light of power relations between market
actors and rules that govern access to local, regional and international chains (Dorward
et al. 2003). In addition, questions were asked about the current shift from state to market-
based governance approaches in Vietnam, more specifically focusing on farmers’ and
fishers’ awareness of state and market-based regulation and their current level of
compliance.
In total, 421 discrete chain actors were surveyed in September and October 2008,
collecting information for their production for January–December 2007. Informants
included were: 90 fish farmers, 91 fishing households, 10 Pangasius hatcheries, 7 pro-
cessing companies, 22 traders and 20 chain facilitators (NGOs and government depart-
ments), across An Giang, Dong Thap and Hau Giang provinces. In addition, six focus
group discussions were held to validate the results, and a large workshop was held at the
end of the field research with a wide range of private sector companies and government
departments, from both the national and provincial levels, to explore the policy implica-
tions of the findings. The three provinces are representative of fishery production in the
Mekong Delta, together accounting for 74% of total area and 68% of the total production
volume of Pangasius. Similarly, they account for *70% of the total catch of Hen-
icorhynchus spp. and Labiobarbus spp. by volume (Thoa 2009). Two districts with the
largest culture area and production volume were chosen from each province: Chau Thanh
and Chau Phu (An Giang), Cao Lanh and Thanh Binh (Dong Thap), and Vinh Thanh and
Thot Not (Hau Giang). Within these districts, two communes were randomly selected to
take part in the survey.
3 Pangasius hypopthalmus value chain
3.1 Volume, functions and channels
The survey recorded 1.2 million tonnes of Pangasius traded in 2007 representing an
estimated 28.9% of total aquaculture production in Vietnam and 50.6% in the Mekong
Delta. Of this, 91.4% of the trade was exported, emphasising the international nature of the
industry (Fig. 2). There are five distinct functions within the chains including a general
group of input suppliers, grow-out and hatchery farmers, traders, processors and retailers.
The composition of chains actors differed depending on whether the channel extended to
domestic or export markets, but the function of these actors across the channels remained
relatively similar.
The Pangasius chain is predominantly export oriented and, as a result, dominated by
processing companies. The first channel in Vietnam is a vertically integrated international
chain extending from producers to processors and export markets. The export trade extends
to well-established markets such as Japan, United States and European Union, as well as
emerging markets such as Egypt, Russia and Ukraine. The results indicate that nearly all
producers selling fish to export markets have a direct contract with processing companies,
thereby avoiding the extra costs incurred by collectors. This is not consistent with other
studies that show that collectors play an important role in trading Pangasius and providing
credit to farmers (Bush and Le Minh 2006; Loc 2006). Nevertheless, the results indicate
that there is a tendency towards vertical integration by processing companies in order to
maintain greater control over farming practices.
The second channel is a domestic flow of fish from producers, to traders, wholesalers
and finally consumers in major urban centres such as Ho Chi Minh City. This channel
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accounts for 8.9% of total production, passing from producers to collectors, who then sell
to wholesalers, retailers or processing companies. Approximately, one-third of the fish sold
in domestic markets is processed, made up of both filleted fish as well as waste material
from processing companies. The domestic chain is also a secondary market for those
farmers who do not meet the quality or safety requirements of export markets. Quality
failures mainly consist of meat discolouration or fish that cannot be delivered live to
processing companies, while safety failures mainly include problems with antibiotic or
probiotic contamination. The survey results indicate that most disqualification from export
markets occurs at the farm gate as only 1.9% of fish is traded from processing companies to
domestic markets.
3.2 Pangasius chain facilitators
A large number of state, private and civil society organisations facilitate both domestic and
international trade of Pangasius (Fig. 2). Market support is provided by the Vietnam
Association of Seafood Exporters and Processors (VASEP) who provide processors and
exporters information and training on quality and safety requirements. In addition, the
Provincial Trade Promotion Center and the National Trade Promotion Center explore new
export markets, as well as publically broadcasting market prices and new developments in
farming techniques and quality standards.
VASEP also sponsors the An Giang Fisheries Association (AFA), a member-based
organisation set up after the US Anti dumping case in 2003 to advocate farmers’ interests
in policy and negotiate individual contracts with processing companies. However, the
survey found that only half of the respondents believed AFA operated effectively, pro-
viding information on inputs and market prices, production techniques and effective
Fig. 2 Pangasius value chain in Vietnam
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disease control. The remaining respondents thought AFA was ineffective because the
association had no decisive role in negotiating contracts between members and processing
companies, banks or feed companies. One in ten respondents said the relationship of AFA
with processing companies was ambiguous and, as a result, members doubt its willingness
to advocate their interests.
The main source of technical support for farmers is the Fishery Extension officers
within the District Agriculture Departments. They offer training to hatchery and grow-out
farmers in new aquaculture technologies as well as instruct farmers on governmental
policies to increase Pangasius hygiene and safety. In addition, there are a range of technical
programmes for farms including irrigation projects for raising aqua products, projects to
upgrade breeding centres. More specialised support on veterinary issues is provided by the
National Fisheries Quality Assurance and Veterinary Directorate (NAFIQUAVED), which
is also responsible for checking, controlling as well as certifying feed, fingerlings and fish
processing.
3.3 Added value
The average total net added value in the Pangasius chain is estimated at US$0.29 per kg.
The results also show that the percentage net added value between actors in the export and
domestic channels are relatively similar (Table 1). Traders contribute the lowest net added
value at 17.5%. Producers and retailers/processors in both import and export channels have
a similar contribution of net added value; 41.3 and 40.1% in the export channel and 46.9–
53.1% in the domestic channel. Overall, farmers’ profit is similar in both of the channels at
US$0.12 per kg. However, the share of profit and income differs greatly by size of farm.
Table 2 shows that farms with a pond area of less than 0.5 ha make up 89% of all farms,
but receive 11% of the income and only 4.8% of the profit from the export value chains.
The contribution of labour relative to benefits received differs between the chain actors.
The results show that farmers contribute 1.2% of labour to the value chain and 38.7% of
the net added value, while receiving 48.2% of gross profit and 44.5% of gross income from
the chain. By comparison, traders contribute 3.4% of labour to the value chain and 17.5%
Table 1 Integrated analysis of value in the Pangasius hypopthalmus chain in Vietnam
Actor
Analysis
Farmers Traders Processors Total
1. Total working time (months) 107 81 20680 20868
2. Total labour cost (US$) 10048,68 6526,07 2873124,80 2889699,60
3. Volume traded (tonnes) 1,200,000 106,800 1,096,800
4. Selling price (US$/kg) 0.92 1.06 1.15
5. Profit (US$/kg) 0.12 0.05 0.14
6. Gross profit (million US$) 144.00 5.34 153.55 302.89
7. Gross income (million US$) 1104.00 113.21 1261.32 2478.53
8. Labour costs (US$/kg) 0.0002 0.0007 0.0196
9. Percentage share of labour costs per kg 1.2 3.4 95.4 100.0
10. Percentage share of profit per kg 38.7 17.5 43.8 100.0
11. Percentage share of total profit 48.2 1.9 49.9 100.0
12. Percentage share of total income 44.5 4.6 50.9 100.0
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of net added value, while receiving 1.9% of gross profit and 4.6% of the gross added value
in the chain. The rest of the labour is contributed by processing companies. In return,
processing companies receive 49.9% of the gross profit which is similar to the overall share
of farmers but 26 times higher than the share of traders. By comparison, we estimate the
average gross profit of a single processing company at US$1,861,642 per year and the
average gross profit for individual farmers at US$11,621 per year.
The unequal proportion in profit and income among the actors in the value chain
highlights a significant vulnerability. Consequently, there is an endemic cycle of over and
under supply within the chain that affects the confidence of farmers and processing
companies alike to invest in improving infrastructure and supply contracts.
Further data collected in August 2008 illustrate this cycle, with farmers costs having
risen sharply, largely due to peak fuel prices in 2008. The cost of feed in particular rose
between US$0.06 and US$0.09 per kg to a current average price of between US$0.48 and
US$0.54 per kg. At the same time, declining demand in international markets led to
decrease in market price to US$0.88 to US$0.92, approximately US$0.10 to US$0.13 per kg
lower than the total cost per kg. In addition, it appears the price of antibiotics and vita-
mins has increased between 30 and 40% compared to 2007. Based on these figures, it is
estimated the market price for Pangasius needs to rise to US$0.98 per kg to ensure
profitability.
4 Henicorhynchus/Labiobarbus spp. value chain
4.1 Value chain actors, functions and channels
The survey recorded 79,800 tonnes of Henicorhynchus/Labiobarbus spp. traded in 2007
through a value chain consisting of five main actors, operating in three channels (Fig. 3).
Because of the lack of information on total catches, it is not possible to estimate what
proportion of the total capture production this represents. The first value chain channel
passes from fishers to traders and processors before being sold to either domestic or
international markets. This channel comprises 11.9% of the total volume traded, with 3.1%
passing directly through to export markets and 8.7% passing back to retailers before being
sold to domestic markets. A second channel, making up 8.1% of total volume, passes from
fishers to traders before being sold directly to domestic markets. This channel passes from
fishers to retailers and onto domestic markets making up 18.7% of total fish traded. Finally,
fish are traded through a direct channel from fishers to domestic consumers. In most cases,
Table 2 Income and profit of grow-out farms selling to the export value chain by size of farm
Size of farm Proportion
of farms










\0.5 ha 49 89 84 10.3 4.8 11.0
0.5–1 ha 24 6 100 19.4 27.4 19.3
[1 ha 27 5 100 61.4 67.8 64.1
Total 100 100 91.1 100 100
* Based on DARD and DoS (2008) census of ponds—see Table 6
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this exchange occurs locally between households and comprises the majority of the
Henicorhynchus/Labiobarbus spp. traded.
There is no reliable data on the quantities of Henicorhynchus/Labiobarbus spp.
exported. However, two companies have also begun selling the fish to international mar-
kets in cans. The Antesco Company sells canned fish with sugarcane and exports 10% of its
15 tonnes/year production, and the Ba Giao Khoe 55555 Salted Fish Company exports
60% of its 150 tonnes/year production of salted and dried fish. Both companies report that
their fish is imported from Cambodia. This fish bypasses the main trade networks, and
therefore not detected in the survey, because the companies hire boats that travel directly to
the Dai fishery on Tonle Sap during the main fishing season.
4.2 Supporters and facilitators
There are no formal organisations or institutions supporting actors in the Henicorhynchus/
Labiobarbus spp. value chain. The actors in the chain make decisions related to production
and trade based on their own experience with the largely migratory fishery during the wet
season.
Fishers rely heavily on informal support services for credit and technical information.
The results show that 34% of respondents receive informal loans for replacing fishing
equipment, boat maintenance and fuel. A quarter of these respondents borrowed from
private lenders with an average interest rate of 10% per month. By comparison family
lending networks charge an average interest rate of 9% per month over 18 months, while
the women’s union charge a much lower interest rate of 0.7% per month over 12 months.
Respondents also report receiving informal support from traders with preservation tech-
nologies, including ice and cool boxes. In return, these traders buy all of their fish and do
Fig. 3 Henicorhynchus/Labiobarbus spp. value chain Vietnam
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not permit the fishers to sell to their competitors—a practice common across the Mekong
Basin (e.g. Bush and Le Minh 2006; Bush 2004; Navy 2004; Seng 2006).
Vietnamese fishers report not being able to readily access formal credit because of a
lack of collateral. As such, these fishers see informal ‘quasi-credit’ arrangements (see
Platteau and Abraham 1987) as preferable because they provide flexible credit which
allows them to repackage their debt by balancing repayments with fish or cash, therefore,
ensuring they can meet their family’s subsistence needs before selling their surplus. In
addition, debt-tied trade is independent of market price fluctuation. As interest rates are
embedded in the price fishers are not affected by these changes. In contrast, fishers reported
that formal lending is inflexible, with repayment schedules that do not allow for seasonal
variation in catch.
4.3 Added value
The average total net added value in the Henicorhynchus/Labiobarbus spp. chain is esti-
mated at US$0.68 per kg (see Table 3). The analysis shows that while fishers contribute
82.4% of total labour cost to the value chain, they only contribute 20.4% of net added value
and receive 40.7% of the total profit and 41.2% of the total income. By comparison,
collectors contribute 6.4% of total labour costs and receive 4.3% of the profit per kg, 2.1%
of the total chain profit, and 12.3% of total income of the whole chain. Retailers contribute
11.2% of total labour cost and receive 75.3% profit: 3.7 times more than fishers and 17.5
times more than collectors and wholesalers. Retailers also capture half of the total profit of
the chain and 46.5% of the chain’s total income.
The relative geographical isolation of many of these fishers, their low levels of oper-
ating capital, and poor access to formal credit means they are dependent on collectors and
retailers. Unlike the Pangasius chain, it appears fishers are more dependent on retailers to
sell Henicorhynchus/Labiobarbus spp. to domestic retail markets. For large-scale fishers,
this is due to the high volume of fish caught in migratory seasons, requiring fast, efficient
and specialised market provisioning. In comparison, small-scale fishers are more






1. Total working time (months/year) 30 26 10 66
2. Total labour cost (US$) 1913.40 937.57 637.80 3488.77
3. Trading volume (tonnes) 79,800 19,551 30,883
4. Selling price (US$/kg) 0.33 0.40 0.96
5. Profit (US$/kg) 0.14 0.03 0.51 0.68
6. Total profit (1000 US$) 11,172.0 586.5 15,750.3 27,508.8
7. Total income (1000 US$) 26,334.0 7,820.4 29,647.7 63,802.1
8. Labour costs (US$/kg) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
9. Percentage share of labour costs per kg 82.4 6.4 11.2 100.0
10. Percentage share of profit per kg 20.4 4.3 75.3 100.0
11. Percentage share of total profit 40.7 2.1 57.2 100.0
12. Percentage share of total income 41.2 12.3 46.5 100.0
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dependent on retailers and collectors to purchase their fish at landing sites because of the
poor economy of scale they face in transporting small, inconsistent quantities to market.
5 Value chain-dependent livelihoods
Livelihoods analysis adds to the results of the structure and function of the two value
chains by comparing the vulnerability of fishers and farmers to economic and political
change. The following addresses the economic vulnerability of fishers and farmers, by
presenting results from the survey on: (1) the challenges fishers and farmers face in
securing their livelihoods within global and regional value chains, (2) the awareness of
farmers and fishers of prevailing government policy and regulation and (3) the impact these
policies have on farmer’s ability to secure their livelihoods.
5.1 Pangasius farmers
Pangasius farmers have an investment ratio of 1.04. This is comparable to the findings of
Ngo (2008) and Sinh and Hien (2009) showing rates of return for grow-out farmers of 1.13
and 1.12, respectively, with a standard deviation of 1.17. Although returns are positive,
they are associated with a high degree of variation and, therefore, risk. The risk inherent in
the industry is also indicated by the increasing failure rates of farmers in the Delta (Fig. 4).
It is possible that the estimated 30% of farmers that have remained profitable in 2009 are
the larger industrial farmers who account for between 91.4% of the total export production.
The results show that the average production costs of Pangasius grow-out farmers are
US$462,729 per hectare per year or US$240,649 per hectare per crop (Tables 4, 5).
However, the later figure differs considerably by size of farm, with larger farms being
considerably more efficient than smaller farms in their production costs. Overall, Pangasius
grow-out farmers make a return on investment of 4.2%, higher than many other industries,
with medium and larger farmers receiving returns of up to 16.2%. However, these returns
are offset by the largest number of smaller farmers that in recent years have had a negative


























Fig. 4 Success and failure rate of Pangasius producers 2007–2009. Based on data from Sinh and Hien
(2009), Ngo (2008) and government estimates made at the Pangasius Aquaculture Dialogue July 2009, Can
Tho University
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production in recent years also demonstrates the high risk nature of grow-out production
(see Table 6).
Nursery farmers and hatcheries also have considerable costs, but only 39 and 54% of the
costs incurred by grow-out farmers. Nursery farmers are also the most profitable with a











Total costs/year (US$) 53 10 28 53 62
Mean 4649,56 10396,14 250649,02 178717,94 462768,55
Std deviation 10593,86 9707,32 597108,36 477648,42 593893,85
Total net income/year (US$)
? Mean 1581,74 1575,37 27380,75 21072,91 10208,05
? Std deviation 2085,61 637,80 28956,12 30384,79 42337,16
Net income per capita/year (US$)
Mean 344,41 408,19 6416,27 4783,50 2676,70
Std deviation 497,48 197,72 7462,26 7034,93 10561,97
* Henicorhynchus/Labiobarbus spp
Table 5 Return of Investment of grow-out farmers by size of farm







\0.5 ha 263516,18 246791,74 -16724,45 0,94 -6,3
0.5–1 ha 274838,95 319462,56 44623,61 1,16 16,2
[1 ha 167382,46 195419,63 28037,17 1,17 16,8
Total 240648,59 250856,64 10208,05 1,04 4,2
* Based on DARD and DoS (2008) census of ponds—see Table 6
Table 6 Changes in the number of Pangasius farms in An Giang Province by area of ponds
Area of ponds
(m2)
Number of farms Proportion (%) Percentage change
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006–2007 2007–2008 2006–2008
\500 1,910 1,271 913 38,4 16,8 16,7 -33 -28 -52
500–1,000 1,040 1,884 945 20,9 24,9 17,3 81 -50 -9
1,000–2,000 1,064 1,778 1,530 21,4 23,5 28.00 67 -14 44
2,000–3,000 358 1,339 945 7,2 17,7 17,3 274 -29 164
3,000–5,000 313 620 530 6,3 8,2 9,7 98 -15 69
5,000–10,000 159 401 317 3,2 5,3 5,8 152 -21 99
10,000–20,000 95 159 175 1,9 2,1 3,2 67 10 84
[20,000 30 106 104 0,6 1,4 1,9 253 -2 247
Total 4,969 7,558 5,459 100 100 100 52 -28 10
Adapted from DARD and DoS (2008)
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return on investment of *11%, reflecting the higher risk of mortality in this phase of
production. Despite this risk, nurseries succeed with 77.9% of their crops, 3% more than
grow-out farmers. The failure rate is only 3% higher than that of grow-out farmers;
however, the impact of a crop failure is considerably more catastrophic for a grow-out
operation because of the much higher cost of production. For example, if processing
companies refuse to buy the fish or disease kills the fish in the last month of production, it
can take up to 3 years before they return to consistent profit margins.
Pangasius hypophthalmus aquaculture is a relatively new activity with 55% of the
households investing in production after 2003. The large investment farmers make in
Pangasius means they are less willing to diversify away from Pangasius, (Fig. 5). This is
either because of the high returns they receive when production succeeds, or because they
need to persist with production to pay off debts. The survey found that grow-out farmers
are two times less likely to be involved in trading activities than hatchery and nursing
households. However, as production has remaining profitable has become more difficult,
many farmers have diversified away from production. Information from DARD and DoS
(2008) indicates that the number of small and medium farmers producing Pangasius
fluctuated greatly between 2006 and 2008 (see Table 6). In particular, farmers with a pond
area less than 0.1 ha have decreased 52%, shifting their production to alternative species
such as Channa spp. (Snakehead), Trichogaster pectoralis (Snakeskin Gourami) and
Tilapia spp.
5.2 Fishing households
Fishing households have average annual costs of US$4649.56–84% less than Pangasius
grow-out farmers (Table 4). Fishers and fish traders have the highest return on investment
of all groups surveyed at 34 and 15%, respectively. However, in real terms, fishing
households receive a total net income of US$1581.74, or US$344 per person per year,
approximately ten times less than Pangasius farmers. As shown in the value chain analysis,
the main constraint this group faces in increasing their income is their lack of ability to
negotiate prices as a result of the quasi-credit contracts they have with traders. The results
also show that landless fishing households without alternative income streams from agri-





















ts No capacity to diversify
Capacity and willingness to diversify
Capacity but no willingness or need to diversify
Fig. 5 Capacity and willingness of farmers to diversify their primary livelihood activity away from fishing
or farming
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government classifies as ‘poor’ (MOLISA 2005). Furthermore, only 59.9% of Heni-
corhynchus/Labiobarbus spp. fishers and 61% of Henicorhynchus/Labiobarbus spp. traders
reported marking a profit during the past 5 years, again indicating the variability of catches
and increasing price of inputs such as fuel.
Fishing is a secondary occupation to agriculture and livestock, but remains an important
source of income with only 30 and 37% of households carrying out rice farming or
livestock, respectively. As indicated in Fig. 4, fishers are more willing to diversify than
Pangasius farmers. However, very few fishing households have the capacity to diversify,
especially in Pangasius aquaculture. As indicated by the DARD and DoS (2008) census
data, Pangasius appears to be an increasingly unlikely option for rural households in the
Mekong Delta given the 37% decline in the smallest category of Pangasius farms between
2006 and 2008 (see Table 6). Our results show that since 2003, only 4% of fishing
household respondents have invested in Pangasius farming, while the number of house-
holds dependent solely on fishing for their income has increased 13.2%. This further
demonstrates the difficulties fishers face in investing in the industry and the consolidation
of Pangasius in the hands of larger, capital intensive investors.
5.3 Challenges to livelihoods
Fishers and farmers face a series of challenges in securing their livelihoods in the face of
changing market relations. The results indicate that the key challenges for both groups are
their limited capacity to negotiate the terms of employment and access to credit.
Off-season labour for fishers on Pangasius farms is increasingly difficult to find because
of the technical skills needed to effectively manage feed, stocking and the use of chemicals.
An increasing proportion of farm employees are university educated making it difficult for
farmers, who on average have a primary school education, to compete. Unskilled labour is
used predominantly for seasonal pond harvesting, which pays on average US$ 230 per
month; only marginally above the threshold for ‘poor’ households, and too low, they
report, to support their families. Conversely, farmers are concerned about the increasing
expectations labourers have for their rates of pay, arguing that that they are already being
squeezed from higher costs of production. The need to employ skilled labour for technical
aspects of production also means that costs have increased because of the risk of chemical
contamination. The result is greater competition for university graduates, which has sub-
sequently driven up average wages from US$88 per month in 2006 to US$103 per month to
2008.
Both fishers and farmers rely heavily on credit from family networks and middlemen.
Although these informal sources credit provide an important source of short-term finance,
it also limits their ability to adapt to rapidly changing production costs and market prices.
Middlemen in particular are an important source of financial support for 7.8% of farmers
and 30.8% of fishers who are unable to get formal loans. Nearly two-thirds of respondents
reported being reliant on these family networks for financial and technical support when
they had low production or when cash was needed for household emergencies. The results
show the flexibility on loan repayments and the additional support they often receive when
emergency credit is needed outweighs the benefits of having a lower interest rate with
formal credit. Nevertheless, approximately half of all respondents said they would like to
bypass their trader-creditors by establishing more direct trading relations with processing
companies and retailers.
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5.4 Policy awareness and support
Approximately half of the Pangasius farmers surveyed were concerned about the emer-
gence of environmental regulations over production. However, only 37% of fishers thought
that any real impact would eventuate from these regulations because of the low level of
surveillance over their activities by government officials. The main areas of concern for
farmers and fishers alike include land and water policy, technical support for pond design
and access to credit. In addition, fishers are concerned about the impact of fishing regu-
lation on their activities.
Approximately three-quarters of farmers were able to recognise the key government
regulations related to land and water management, but all reported that these had little or
no impact on their production practices. Despite wanting to move their ponds to more
suitable land, or extend their system to include sediment ponds, smaller farmers are
constrained by the cost of renting of buying new land. Larger, wealthier farmers are more
able to comply with site selection criteria and water treatment regulations when expanding
their operations. However, low enforcement by government agencies has meant that many
of these producers have been able to avoid having to comply with these regulations.
Farmers are particularly knowledgeable about chemical use; however, only 25% of all
respondents believe these regulations have any benefit to production. There are two main
reasons farmers choose not to comply with these regulations. First, they wish to protect
their investment from disease as well as wanting maximum growth in shortest length of
time. Second, farmers believe they are able to apply many of the chemicals and then, by
stopping the application of these chemicals in time, avoid detection by the processing
companies.
Policies relating to seed are seen by farmers as being moderately successful. More than
80% of farmers are aware of the government’s attempts to centralise control of seed quality
through State-operated ‘seed centres’, but only half of these farmers see the policies as
providing more security to their production. Consequently, half of the farmers surveyed
believe that the policies make no perceivable difference to their production. Similarly,
policies relating to the use of manufactured feed and the registration of farms are seen as
having the most positive effect. Fewer farmers knew about these policies than knew of
policies related to seed and drug use regulation. Furthermore, two-thirds of respondents
believed policies related to seed had no positive impact on their production because they
rely mainly on their own experience, or advice from other famers and suppliers.
As farmers are embedded in increasingly global value chains, they are being exposed to
formal contractual arrangements. Farmers throughout the Delta in particular argue that
more elaborate contractualisation to processing companies signed at the start of a pro-
duction cycle would decrease their vulnerability to price fluctuation. Despite these
observed benefits, less than half of the respondents knew of government policies designed
to promote better conditions for production contracts. Nearly three-quarters of those who
knew about the policies believed they had no impact on their production and trading
activities. The main reason for this negative assessment is that parties breaking contracts
are rarely prosecuted.
Vietnam has developed laws related to the marketing of fish products, including reg-
istration of traders and monitoring of quality management in wholesalers and processing
companies. Despite the effort to promote these laws as part of the wider push for an export-
driven economy, only 58% of respondents know of these policies and regulations. Fur-
thermore, approximately two-thirds of respondents reported that these marketing policies
have little impact on their production and trading practices.
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Fishers were relatively knowledgeable about policies and regulation related to fishing
and the use of water resources. In total, 88 and 62% of fishers knew about recent changes to
these respective policies. However, nearly 90% of fishers acknowledge that these policies
have little or no effect on environmental protection. Fishing regulations were acknowl-
edged as having brought about change in fishing practices by only 12.5% of respondents,
while 44% argued that these regulations had no effect on fishing, largely because of ‘‘free
riding’’ behaviour and poor enforcement of the use of illegal fishing gear.
6 Discussion
6.1 Value chain form and function
The results confirm the export orientation of the Pangasius industry and show a new trend
to export markets for Henicorhynchus/Labiobarbus spp. in Vietnam. New markets for
Henicorhynchus/Labiobarbus spp. hold significant implications for fishers as the overall
catch of the fish declines and prices increase. The more transparent and vertically inte-
grated export oriented chains show the potential for small-scale farmers to capture sig-
nificantly higher value than fishers. However, the results demonstrate that fishers and grow-
out farmers are the most vulnerable actors in their respective chains. The main constraint
faced by fishers and farmers is their poor bargaining power. Both groups account for the
lowest gross added value and receive the lowest income of any actor in their respective
value chains. In contrast, processors and retailers capture more than two-thirds of the gross
profit in the chain.
The results also show there is relatively little support for Henicorhynchus/Labiobarbus
spp. fishers. Until now, there have been few state, private or NGOs who have intervened in
the value chains to provide technical support or regulation over quality or safety. The fishery
remains largely outside the government’s regulation and control, especially as a large
proportion of the fish is thought to come across the border from Cambodia. There are very
little data on this transboundary trade, but there is some evidence that the volume of trade is
considerable. For example, Seng (2006) estimates that in 2003 traders were selling a large
amount of small species such as Henicorhynchus/Labiobarbus spp. for US$0.34 per kg.
As demand for the fish increases in Vietnam, especially in domestic and export consumer
markets, these illegal flows of fish may become more important.
For fishers to capture a higher share of profits, they will have to strengthen their links
with retailers and bypass collectors and wholesalers. However, there are considerable
constraints to achieving structural change in these value chains. The quasi-credit schemes
restrict bargaining power of fishers, but they also enable access to credit that is largely
unattainable for poor landless households. Even in the capital intensive Pangasius industry,
quasi-credit schemes cover short-term cash flow issues for inputs such as feed and seed.
Formal (micro) credit schemes may improve the transparency of the value chains and
improve bargaining power, leading to a higher share of profit.
6.2 Income and bargaining power
The study estimates that the annual income of Pangasius farmers is five times higher than
the regional average of US$538 and 14 times higher than the annual income of fishers
(CSO 2007). Although these farmers cannot be considered poor, their relatively high
degree of specialisation and investment make them highly vulnerable to market fluctuation.
High and low value fish chains in the Mekong Delta 903
123
As demonstrated by the international economic crisis of 2008 and 2009, it is increasingly
difficult for farmers to continue to secure these income levels. The capacity of farmers to
specialise or diversify appears to be important determinants of livelihood security.
Smaller Pangasius farmers appear to have less potential for growth given their limited
land holdings, but they are more able to diversity to other fish species, or alternatively to
downgrade from grow-out farming to nursing. (By comparison fishers appear willing to
diversify their income streams away from fishing, but are unable to do so because of a lack
of adequate capital.) If farmers diversify they do so vertically within the industry, shifting
their operations to nursing or hatching during periods when inputs for grow-out farming are
too high. Overall, farmers have been able to move between these three activities relatively
successfully, mainly because the return on investment is also very high, if not higher than
grow-out farming.
Pangasius grow-out farmers are highly dependent on the cost of feed which makes up
nearly 90% of their total operating costs. Because their return on investment is only 4.2%,
the lowest of all the groups surveyed, any change in either the price of feed or lower market
prices can lead to severe losses which are difficult to make up. One of the key mechanisms
farmers use to cope with poor production or poor market prices is access to informal credit.
However, farmers are more able to access credit through informal lenders meaning that any
bridging finance comes with high interest rates and, if from their suppliers or traders, often
implicit conditions of indebtedness. Given the variability of input prices and market
demand is more likely to increase in response to the global economic downturn farmers
will be faced with periods of greater economic vulnerability.
There is a distinct difference in the sources of vulnerability and the capacity of farmers
and fishers to cope with external impacts. Farmers may be more able to deal with envi-
ronmental impacts, especially as these appear to be relatively benign (see Bosma et al.
2009), but as farmers become more dependent on global value chains, they become
exposed to new conditions of market entry and price fluctuation. Fishers are less exposed to
these market fluctuations because traders take more risk in transporting the fish to market.
The lower bargaining power may in fact insulate fishers from economic vulnerability;
however, it also means that they are also unable to diversify away from fishing. Fishers
also appear to be far more vulnerable to environmental change given their dependency on
water quality for the health of fish stocks. They are becoming more vulnerable because
they are dependent on fish stocks which appear to be in decline, or fully exploited. Unlike
Pangasius farmers, these fishers do not have as much collateral for loans, or capital to
diversify. Those that attempt to shift to aquaculture are more often than not unsuccessful.
6.3 Extending value chain governance
The results indicate that government intervention has not been effective in mitigating the
impacts of environmental change, promoting alternative production technologies or
reducing the exposure of fishers and farmers to market fluctuations. The success of the
Pangasius industry has meant that policy, regulation, extension and enforcement have not
been able to keep up with the innovation of farmers. The government has taken an
essentially laissez-faire approach to the development of the Pangasius industry, largely due
to the lack of evidence that there are serious environmental concerns related to production,
and the support this growth has given to economic reform at the national level. Fishers also
regard policies as largely ineffective due to the lack of capacity of the government to
monitor fishing activities, and cross-border trade.
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For value chain governance initiatives to support sustainable production, they will have
to overcome the limitations faced by state policy. The Vietnamese government has begun
investing in the promotion of certification systems such as the WWF Pangasius Aqua-
culture Dialogue, GLOBALGAP and Safe Quality Foods (SQF) (see Bush et al. 2009).
Questions remain over the division of responsibilities between these governance systems
and the state: Can they provide extension and information? Can they provide technical
support to farmers? Are they able to facilitate improved credit arrangements? Further
research is needed, but it appears that private sector actors including processing companies,
feed and chemical suppliers are key actors in extending information to farmers and are also
better situated to respond to the needs of farmers than government extension services.
Although up until now, few price premiums are available in return for compliance with
international standards (see for example Mantingh and Dung 2008), value chain gover-
nance mechanisms may still have the greatest leverage over farmers by regulating access to
lucrative international markets.
The results of the value chain and livelihoods analyses indicate value chain governance
arrangements hold very real implications for the structure and function of trade in the
Mekong Delta. As more than 90% of the volume traded goes to export markets, famers are
dependent on high market prices to remain profitable. Low compliance with standards
regulating these lucrative export markets might mean more fish will be directed into
unregulated domestic markets. Consequently, a shift to domestic markets with similar
prices to export markets means that grow-out farmers may be able to cope with shifting
between channels. However, the higher demand for a variety of alternative fish species in
domestic markets may also be a driving factor for smaller farmers to diversify away from
Pangasius. It is more likely that these farmers will be the 89% majority of ‘smaller’ farmers
that contribute between 20 and 30% of the production and receive only 4.8% of the net
profit (see Table 2). The other 11% of larger farmers are more likely to consolidate their
position in export markets with their stronger connections to the processing companies. For
small-scale farmers to remain competitive, they may require cooperative forms of pro-
duction to improve their economy of scale in both production and the costs of compliance.
The rise of value chain standards and third-party certification systems will increase the
need for improved enforcement of contracts, both in terms of providing protection for
farmers who need assurance that investments made in complying with standards will make
a return. If domestic markets absorb fish that does not comply with environmental or social
certification, the government will also play a continued role in food quality and safety
governance.
For Henicorhynchus/Labiobarbus spp. fishers, the lack of policy enforcement and
policy means their activities will remain relatively unchanged. The difficulty in accessing
flooded areas to monitor the fisheries contributes to the lack of information which can be
used to developed suitable regulation. Furthermore, there are few laws which address
cross-boundary nature of fish(er) migration and trade. The diffuse nature of the resource
and these trade networks means that the state will have to find alternative ways of regu-
lating the resources. The government has been successful in regulating the Dai fisheries in
the past, especially when there was cross-border tensions in the ownership of these nets by
Cambodians in Vietnam. The increased scarcity of Henicorhynchus/Labiobarbus spp. and
the higher value of the fish in domestic urban and international markets, there will be more
financial incentive to monitor and regulate the fishery. As the fishery is highly migratory,
management efforts will remain transboundary. Value chain approaches do not appear to
hold much potential for governing the management of Henicorhynchus/Labiobarbus spp.
in domestic markets. However, if good cross-border management can be established, then
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opportunities may open to also establish better control over cross-border trade of Hen-
icorhynchus and Labiobarbus spp.
7 Conclusion
This study has provided the first detailed account of the form and function of high and low
value fish chains in the Mekong Delta, their contribution to the livelihoods of farmers and
fishers, and the potential for state and private led value chain governance to steer towards
more equitable and environmentally responsible production. In all regards, the two value
chains focus on in this study, P. hypopthalmus and Henichrohynchus/Labiobarbus spp.,
differ markedly. The main finding of the research is that actors in high value export chains
have a higher potential income, but face considerably higher economic vulnerability.
Alternatively, fishers are severely constrained in their ability to negotiate higher prices for
their fish, but appear to be less vulnerable to economic and environmental change due to
the social relations of trade. As a result, value chain governance is more likely to be
effective in high value export chains than domestic or regional value chains.
Government policy in Vietnam has been successful in promoting the growth of the
fisheries sector, but policy has proven less effective in supporting equitable distribution of
benefits along value chains, and reducing the vulnerability of fishers and farmers. The area
farmers believe the government can make the most important intervention is regulating
their contracts with processing companies, as well as feed and seed suppliers. Farmers note
that increased certainty over their variable costs and revenue will allow them to invest in
cleaner production technologies such as water treatment. Given that vertical contractu-
alisation will shift financial risk to processing companies, it is still unclear what further
investment they will make in strengthening provisioning arrangements with farmers.
Fishers largely operate outside government control both in terms of their fishing
practices and economic activities. Fisher’s knowledge about policies and regulations in
most policy areas remains low and they are subject to limited monitoring and surveillance.
As even fishers note, stricter regulation and enforcement would reduce the incidence of
violations. Any government intervention in credit and lending may prove ineffective given
the flexible nature of repayments in informal and quasi-credit arrangements. Future
external interventions in the Henicorynchus/Labiobarbus spp. should aim to better inte-
grate governance arrangements that can build upon existing informal value chain
arrangements. If resistance to state sponsored cooperative structures can be overcome,
there may also be scope in expanding the role of commune level or community arrange-
ments to increase collective bargaining power in markets.
Further research is needed to elaborate the structure and function of value chains for
fingerlings, fish feed and fresh fish for human consumption; the trade-offs between higher
market access and human consumption; the specific importance of processed Henicoryn-
chus and Labiobarbus spp. in domestic, regional and international markets; the specific
support different chain actors need to comply with emerging environmental and social
regulation and standards; and finally, what new role the state should adopt to better
regulate production vis-a`-vis the growing role of private sector led value chain governance.
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